New ARL Advocacy and Public Policy Update Available

On September 26, 2016, ARL released a new Advocacy and Public Policy Update covering the period from July 15 to September 26. This update covers the following issues:

  • Appropriations
  • Emergence of new preprint services
  • White House release of policy on open source software
  • Patricia Flatley Brennan named Director of National Library of Medicine
  • Carla Hayden takes office as Librarian of Congress
  • Copyright and intellectual property (including Copyright Office activities around Section 108 and mandatory deposit, and the Georgia State University e-reserves case)
  • International issues (including the Marrakesh Treaty ratification efforts and India’s recent course pack case)

The full update can be accessed here:

 

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ARL Joins 33 Organizations Urging Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities

On September 13, 2016, ARL joined in a coalition letter of 33 organizations expressing concerns regarding congressional oversight of intelligence activities.  The letter calls on Congress “to provide a meaningful check on the executive branch and reform how it conducts oversight over intelligence matters.”  The letter calls for a number of reforms to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and to strengthen Congressional power, including to provide members with sufficient staff assistance.

The letter concludes:

In addition to the above reforms, we urge you to consider establishing a distinct, broad-based review of the activities of the Intelligence Community since 9/11, modeled after the 9/11 Commission or the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

When questions were raised about the activities of the intelligence community in the 1970s, Congress reacted by forming two special committees, colloquially known as the Pike and Church committees. Reports preceded wholesale reforms of the intelligence community, including improving congressional-oversight mechanisms. The outcome improved congressional oversight and the perception of its efficacy. The House should provide the new select committee adequate staffing and financial support, and give it a broad mandate to review practices and structures associated with congressional oversight of intelligence matters.

The full letter can be read here.

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ICYMI: Library Copyright Alliance Files Comments Regarding Mandatory Deposit

On August 18, 2016, the Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) filed a response to the Copyright Office’s Notice of Inquiry regarding mandatory deposit of online-only books and sound recordings.  LCA’s comments support expansion of the 2010 interim rule, which applied to mandatory deposit of online-only electronic serials (newspapers, journals, etc.), to books and sound recordings.

The comments point out the critical role mandatory deposit plays in the Library’s mission to collect, preserve and provide access to all types of works, regardless of publication type.  LCA’s comments point out:

Without mandatory deposit, works created in the digital age could be lost forever. We have seen this loss happen in the film industry. Approximately half of all films made before 1950, and most silent films, are unavailable because no effective mechanism existed at the national level to preserve these important pieces of our cultural heritage and history. The Library is actively and commendably trying to ensure that such enormous permanent losses are not replicated in the digital era. Mandatory deposit of online-only works is the necessary and appropriate solution. Although the present Notice of Inquiry presents only the issue of extending the interim rule to online-only books and sound recordings, serious consideration also should be given to applying the rule to other categories of works, such as photographs and films, to ensure that all types of works are adequately preserved and included in our national Library.

The comments also support expanding access to works collected through mandatory deposit and:

limiting simultaneous access to two on-site users at dedicated terminals is too restrictive and not in accord with current practices in the library community. Access is an essential component of the Library’s mission and such a limited policy hampers the spread of knowledge and culture. Extension of the applicability of the interim rule should involve reconsideration of the current, overly conservative limitation of accessing materials to two on-site terminals at the Library.

In total, there were fifteen submissions to the Copyright Office with respect to this notice of inquiry.  Libraries submitting comments include the University of Michigan, University of California Los Angeles, and University of Virginia.

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A New Approach to Copyright Exceptions and Limitations

*Guest post by Jonathan Band, policybandwidth*

Any discussion with policymakers or rightsholders concerning the possible adoption of new copyright exceptions and limitations invariably centers on how to make sure that the exception is not abused. This leads to lengthy negotiations resulting in complex, difficult-to-use provisions that resemble the tax code. This pattern has been repeated in connection to the exceptions to section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the TEACH Act for distance education (17 U.S.C. § 110(2)), the Chafee Amendment for the print disabled (17 U.S.C. § 121), and orphan works legislation, to name just a few of the more salient examples.

It’s time for this pattern to be broken. Rightsholders have nothing to fear from exceptions and their possible abuse. Infringement deriving from abuse of exceptions likely would be a tiny fraction of the overall incidence of infringement. At the same time, preventing the public benefits that flow from exceptions undermines the purpose of the copyright system.

Section 108

Unfortunately, this pattern of developing overly restrictive exceptions may soon repeat itself in the context of the exception for libraries and archives in 17 U.S.C. § 108. In 2005, the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office convened a study group consisting of librarians and publishers to consider how to update section 108 for the digital age. After three contentious years, the study group issued a report recommending several possible amendments to section 108, but could not reach consensus on the details of those amendments, nor on how to handle other important issues such as copies for users or license restrictions.

Notwithstanding this lack of consensus, and over the objection of most libraries and archives, the Copyright Office has decided to urge Congress to revise section 108. This past June, the Copyright Office issued a notice of inquiry stating that it seeks “to finalize its legislative recommendation” concerning a “re-drafting” of section 108. In meetings with stakeholders pursuant to this notice of inquiry, the Copyright Office stated that it hopes to complete its legislative recommendation and transmit it to Congress this fall.

Although the Copyright Office hopes to make section 108 simpler and more user-friendly, the Office’s likely concern about “leakage” almost certainly guarantees that the re-drafted section 108 will be complicated and not understandable by librarians without law degrees. And even if the Office somehow manages to produce a streamlined and comprehensible proposal, the rightsholders can be expected to insist on changes to eliminate possible abuse that will inevitably make the proposal more complex.

There is no doubt that digital networks have facilitated copyright infringement. And while the adverse impact of this infringement probably has been overstated by rightsholders, it is perfectly legitimate for rightsholders to take reasonable measures to address infringement. The operative word here is reasonable. And making exceptions for libraries, educational institutions, or the print disabled difficult to use in order to reduce potential leakage is not reasonable.

There are approximately 200 million smartphone users in the United States, and 2 billion smartphone users worldwide. Each smartphone has the capability of reproducing entire copyrighted works and uploading them to the Internet, where they can be disseminated globally. In a world where this technological capability is literally at the fingertips of so many users, what possible difference could it make if there is a small amount of leakage from a library?

Consider the following examples. Under existing section 108(c), a library is permitted to make a replacement copy of a published work that is damaged or lost if the library determines that an unused replacement cannot be obtained at a fair price. While the library may circulate a physical replacement copy, it cannot make a copy available in a digital format outside the library premises. The Section 108 study group recommended modifying the prohibition on off-site lending of digital replacement copies only to allow the lending of a copy reproduced in a digital physical medium if the library’s original copy was also in a digital physical medium. In other words, if the library owned an audiobook CD that was deteriorating, the study group proposal would allow the library to make and lend a replacement CD, but it would not be able to stream the digital file to a user. Similarly, if its original copy wasn’t digital, the library would not be able to make a digital copy viewable outside of the library premises.

The publishers in the Section 108 study group insisted on these restrictions because they were afraid that the digital files would be retransmitted on the Internet. This concern overlooks four facts. First, the exception would only be available if a replacement copy couldn’t be purchased, i.e., the work was out of print so there would be no market harm, even if unlawful retransmission occurred. Second, unlawful copies of any work for which there is current and likely future demand are already available online, so how much incremental harm could be caused by unlawful retransmission of the library’s replacement copy? Third, technological measures exist to make retransmission difficult. Fourth, as fair use jurisprudence has evolved, making the digital copy available outside the library premises with appropriate technological protections likely would be a fair use. In other words, the library could probably engage in the activity anyway under a fair use theory, so why not save the library the burden of performing the fair use analysis and simply permit it under an explicit exception?

A similar analysis could be performed for many of the study group’s other recommendations. For example, the proposed exception for the archiving of publicly accessible websites was unnecessarily regulatory, especially considering that commercial entities such as Google and Microsoft routinely engage in this activity under a fair use theory.

It is the awareness that section 108 reform will be extremely contentious and unlikely to produce positive results that has led to library opposition to the Copyright Office’s initiative.

Section 1201 Rulemaking

Likewise, the exemptions that the Library of Congress has adopted during the course of the triennial rulemaking under section 1201 of the DMCA reflect an unhealthy obsession with possible abuse. The current exemption, adopted in 2015, permits circumvention of the technological protections on lawfully acquired motion pictures by college and university faculty and students, for use of short portions for educational purposes “in film studies or other courses requiring close analysis of film and media excerpts…where the person engaging in circumvention reasonably believes that screen-capture software or other non-circumventing alternatives are unable to produce the required level of high-quality content.” Thus, an instructor or a student may circumvent only after determining that no alternative to circumvention will produce the “level of high-quality content.” This would necessitate that the instructor or student determine: 1) whether the course requires “close analysis of film and media excerpts;” 2) what level of quality excerpt she needs to satisfy her educational purpose; 3) what are the various available alternatives to circumvention; and 4) whether any of these alternatives will produce the required level of quality excerpt. In the K-12 context, this exemption is available only to instructors, not students.

The Copyright Office designed an exemption that requires educational users to jump through many hoops so as to ensure that the exemption is not abused. At the insistence of rightsholders, the Copyright Office evidently considers circumvention to be a highly dangerous activity that leaves films vulnerable to widespread infringement, and thus must be regulated carefully. However, there is no evidence that any infringement resulted from earlier iterations of the exemption that were more straightforward. Further, the software necessary to circumvent the technological protection measures on DVDs or other storage media is widely available on the Internet and easy to use. Moreover, infringing copies of most films can be found on the Internet soon after release. Thus, a simple, broad circumvention exemption for any educational use would not harm the market for the films in any meaningful way. (At one time, some film studios planned to create a market for licensing film clips to educational institutions, but the enormous number of works educators need to access made development of such a market infeasible.)

A New Approach

Rightsholders’ frustration with their loss of control over their content is understandable. It also is understandable that this frustration would fuel a desire to exercise control wherever they can, even though it makes no difference to their bottom line.

Although the rightsholders’ frustration is understandable, it is bad copyright policy to impose the costs of overly restrictive exceptions on libraries and educational institutions where there is no offsetting benefit to rightsholders or society at large. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Kirtsaeng v. Wiley, “copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works.” The Supreme Court then explained that “the statute achieves that end by striking a balance between two subsidiary aims: encouraging and rewarding authors’ creations while enabling others to build on that work.” Exceptions and limitations are the means to achieve the aim of enabling others to build on a work.

Rather than fight reasonable adjustments to Title 17 to accommodate digital technology, rightsholders should embrace them. This not only would better meet the objectives of the copyright system, it also would be in the long run best interest of rightsholders. Instead of advocating for narrow section 1201 exemptions for educational uses of film clips, studios should encourage the broadest possible use of films in classrooms. Doing so would more deeply entrench the role of films in American culture and society.

Similarly, publishers should facilitate libraries making the robust use of their collections. Libraries spend $4 billion a year acquiring books and other materials. The more access libraries are able to provide to their collections—the more libraries are used—the easier it is for libraries to secure the budget they need to purchase more materials. Additionally, greater access to written materials encourages literacy, which in turn leads to greater demand for written materials. Finally, for many users, the alternative to accessing materials through libraries would not be to purchase the materials, but to find infringing copies on the Internet.

The same logic applies to remixes and fan fiction. More enlightened rightsholders have recognized that these activities deepen fan loyalty and result in increased sales. Additionally, these activities train the next generation of artists. And of course, reasonable exceptions enhance the credibility of the copyright system generality.

In short, rightsholders should stop treating libraries and educational institutions—their biggest customers—as their copyright enemies, and instead assist them in promoting the creation and dissemination of culture by supporting the broadest possible copyright exceptions. If rightsholders can’t change direction on their own, policymakers in Congress, the Copyright Office, and the Executive Branch should lead the way. But until rightsholders and policymakers change their approach to exceptions, attempts to fashion new exceptions will largely be exercises in futility.

 

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Why is the Copyright Office Trying to Reform Section 108?

On July 26, the Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) met with the Copyright Office, in response to the Office’s Notice of Inquiry, to give our views on Section 108—namely, LCA’s opposition to amendment. LCA previously released a statement, consistent with previous documents and statements, expressing deep concern over efforts to reform Section 108. As LCA noted in its most recent statement on Section 108, the library community opposes reform of this section because: 1) Section 108 is not obsolete; 2) fair use provides a sufficient update when necessary; 3) amending Section 108 has inherent risks and could limit what libraries currently do today, including the possibility of affecting fair use; 4) amendment of this section would be highly contentious and a time and resource intensive process.

LCA opened the meeting by reiterating our opposition to reform of Section 108, expanding on the points made in the written statement. Many libraries similarly voiced opposition to Section 108 reform during their meetings with the Copyright Office. Given that the vast majority of the community benefiting from the exception does not want to see Section 108 amended, it is disconcerting that the Copyright Office is planning to go ahead with a recommendation to reform this provision of the Copyright Act. Archives, the other beneficiaries of Section 108, have also voiced opposition to Section 108 reform (see: Society of American Archivists and the Internet Archive statements and blog posts). Given that beneficiaries of this provision oppose any updates to Section 108, that—according to those who actually rely on the provision on a daily basis—Section 108 is not obsolete and continues to function well forty years after its enactment, on what basis is the Copyright Office going forward with its recommendation?

When LCA met with the Copyright Office, we were given two answers. The first, the Copyright Office said, is to add museums as a beneficiary to Section 108, a recommendation made by the Section 108 Study Group. The Copyright Office argued that as a potential beneficiary, museums were strong advocates for reform. The second reason was decidedly less persuasive. Supposedly, authors who benefit from library access and are therefore beneficiaries of Section 108 have advocated for amendment to this provision. While authors may certainly be affected by the various limitations and exceptions under copyright law, it is doubtful that groups such as the Authors Guild want reform because of insufficient access to works under Section 108. Of course, because of the way the Copyright Office structured the process—requiring in person meetings or, if necessary, phone discussions—there is no written record.

One of the big complaints LCA has had about the current process is this utter lack of transparency regarding the meetings. LCA’s written statement noted, “LCA is concerned about the lack of transparency relating to this inquiry. LCA expects the Copyright Office to publish a list of the interested parties it meets in the course of this inquiry as well as a detailed summary of what each of these parties advised.” While the Copyright Office has agreed to release a list of everyone they have met with regarding Section 108 reform, it will not be issuing a summary of what was discussed in those meetings. The lack of substantive information regarding the topics of conversation and recommendations by various stakeholders is disappointing. We will not know the substance of the reforms proposed by stakeholders. While authors may indeed be pushing for 108 reform, as the Copyright Office stated in LCA’s meeting, whether it is because they find a lack of access to works in libraries (as the Copyright Office implied) or because they want to restrict library activity (as the Authors Guild certainly tried to do as evidenced by their lawsuit and briefs in its litigation against HathiTrust) cannot be confirmed.

Furthermore, without a written record, comments made during the meeting may be misunderstood. LCA did, for example, discuss some substantive changes to 108 that might be beneficial while trying to reiterate opposition to reform. However, could the Copyright Office construe it as support for reform? Could the Copyright Office issue a legislative proposal and state that the Library Copyright Alliance was supportive of certain concepts, such as contract preemption (a provision which would specify that contracts cannot override limitations and exceptions), and therefore supportive of reform? Hopefully, the Copyright Office will be upfront in any recommendation it makes by putting its proposal in the proper context, explaining that stakeholders have differing approaches and positions with respect to 108 reform efforts.

Ultimately, it seems like a waste of time to put in so much effort to try to reform a section of the copyright law that is actually functioning pretty well. Contrary to the Copyright Office’s repeated assertions that Section 108 is “obsolete,” libraries rely on this provision every day to make preservation copies, to replace items in older formats, to engage in inter-library loan, to reproduce copies for patrons, and more. Copyright Office resources would be better spent addressing areas of copyright that are in greater need of reform, like Section 1201 and the incredibly burdensome process by which one must go through to request an exemption (which the Copyright Office is indeed reviewing), statutory damages, or truly outdated sections of the Copyright Act that refer to things like coin-operated equipment and players (a comment brought up by Jonathan Band during LCA’s meeting).

What’s next? Instead of focusing on the areas in true need of reform or sections that are obsolete, the Copyright Office is pushing forward with a proposal to reform a functioning section of the law. The Copyright Office noted that it was wrapping up its meetings with stakeholders and that it was unlikely to solicit any written comments. The Copyright Office stated that it would prepare a legislative recommendation to be released in the fall or winter. ARL and LCA will carefully review the proposal once it is released. Ultimately, however, the inherent risks in reforming Section 108 are unlikely to outweigh what may be modest benefits in an update to a section of the copyright act that is actually working.

For Further Reading: TechDirt recently released a great post explaining, “Copyright Office Intent on Changing The Part of Copyright That Protects Libraries & Archives, Even Though No One Wants it Changed.”

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Moving from SSRN to SocArXiv

In May, Elsevier acquired SSRN, an open access repository heavily used in fields of law, economics and other social sciences. A number of great articles raising serious concerns about this acquisition were written following Elsevier and SSRN’s announcement, including posts by Brandon Butler and Ellen Ramsey, Kevin Smith, Paul Gowder, the Authors Alliance, and TechDirt, among others.

More recently, reports surfaced that SSRN started removing articles from its database even when the author to the posted article retained copyright and had explicit permission to post to SSRN. Articles posted under a CC license or originally posted in green open access journals were similarly removed, even where the article contained an explicit footnote asserting that the authors retained copyright. After a huge backlash, SSRN started restoring the papers upon the request of authors claiming a mistake in enforcing their copyright policies. SSRN also indicated that faculty posting final papers would need to add a statement in a footnote asserting copyright and open access permissions or submit their publication agreements to SSRN in order to have their papers posted.

Authors Alliance—as well as numerous academics—responded by asking whether it is time for authors to remove their papers from SSRN and find alternatives. Authors Alliance pointed out:

SSRN authors: you have not committed to SSRN. You can remove your papers from their service, and you can opt instead to make your work available in venues that show real commitment to the sharing, vetting, and refinement of academic work.

Alternatives obviously include an academic’s institutional repository or personal website, but authors might also consider the new, non-profit open access archive for social science research, SocArXiv. The recent announcement of this new archive comes at an opportune time given Elsevier’s May acquisition of SSRN and the ensuing changes to SSRN policies regarding posting of papers. SocArXiv, in partnership with the Center for Open Science, explained:

The initiative responds to growing recognition of the need for faster, open sharing of research on a truly open access platform for the social sciences. Papers on SocArXiv will be permanently available and free to the public.

Social scientists want their work to be broadly accessible, but it is mostly locked up from the public and even other researchers—even when the public has paid for it. SocArXiv wants to help change that. In recent years, academic networking sites have offered to make preprints available and help researchers connect with each other, but the dominant networks are run by for-profit companies whose primary interest is in growing their business, not in providing broad access to knowledge. SocArXiv puts access front and center, and its mission is to serve researchers and readers, not to make money.

Immediately after news broke that SSRN was removing papers, I checked my own author page to see if my dozen or so journal articles and briefs were still posted.  They are and I will use my author page one final time: to download my papers (they’re easier for me to find this way since I placed all of them on SSRN and won’t have to look through different files on my computer to collect them all) before moving them to try out SocArXiv. I hope other others consider moving their works to SocArXiv, as well.

For further reading, see Richard Poynder, “SocArXiv debuts, as SSRN acquisition comes under scrutiny.”

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Assessing the DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Regime

*Guest post by Jonathan Band, policybandwidth*

There is an escalating war of words between supporters and detractors of the notice-and-takedown regime of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The content providers argue that the notice-and-takedown system is broken and advocate for its replacement with a notice-and-staydown system. The Internet industry responds that notice-and-takedown is essential to the vibrancy of the Internet, and that the regime demanded by the content providers would require costly and ineffective filtering and monitoring.

This debate about whether the legislative compromise reflected by the notice-and–takedown system still works misses the larger context in which Congress created the notice-and-takedown system and in which the system must be evaluated. Congress enacted the notice-and-takedown system in 1998 as one title of the much broader DMCA. This broader statute, in a separate title, established prohibitions on the circumvention of technological protection measures. These two titles were adopted together to create a balanced approach to copyright enforcement in the Internet environment. Thus, the effectiveness–and fairness–of the notice-and-takedown system should not be considered in isolation, but in relation to the effectiveness and fairness of the anti-circumvention provisions.

The Latest Round of the Debate

For years the content providers have complained about various provisions of the DMCA’s safe harbors for Internet service providers, but their primary target has been the notice-and-takedown system codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) and (d). The latest round of attack started with a full-page ad on June 20, 2016, in the Washington D.C. newspapers The Hill, Politico, and Roll Call placed by music industry organizations such as the Recording Industry Association of America and well-known recording artists including Taylor Swift and Paul McCartney. The ad asserted that the DMCA “is broken and no longer works for creators.” It claimed that the DMCA “was written and passed in an era that is technologically out-of-date compared to the era in which we live.” The ad did not specify precisely why “the DMCA simply doesn’t work,” but observed that “it’s impossible for tens of thousands of individual songwriters and artists to muster the resources necessary to comply with its application.” Based on earlier statements by the RIAA and other music industry associations, this presumably was an allusion to the burden of copyright owners sending notices to a platform every time a user uploads infringing content—a burden that would be alleviated by a notice-and-staydown regime. The ad further stated that “the tech companies who benefit from the DMCA were not the intended protectorate when it was signed into law nearly two decades ago.

The ad provoked a quick response from the tech sector. Matt Schruers with the Computer & Communications Industry Association noted that RIAA was asking Congress “to upend one of the legal cornerstones of the Internet.” Schruers observed that the DMCA’s safe harbors “allowed the Internet to become what it is today—a worldwide democratizing platform for communication, creativity, and commerce.” Schruers stated tens of thousands of Internet platforms relied on the safe harbors to provide millions of creators a cost-free means of reaching a worldwide audience without the interference of traditional gatekeepers such as record labels, movie studios, or book publishers.

Michael Beckerman with the Internet Association similarly asserted that “If you love the Internet, you should thank the DMCA.” He explained that Internet companies should not be responsible for “policing every single piece of online content” because they “don’t have access to constantly changing licensing information, nor are they the appropriate party to make legal judgments about whether content qualifies as fair use….” He added that many Internet companies voluntarily employ “DMCA-plus” programs to provide greater flexibility to copyright owners to address infringing activity.

Neil Fried with the Motion Picture Association of America replied by arguing that “Congress did not intend the DMCA to create a relentless game of Whac-A-Mole.” Fried further complained that “content creators must still endlessly notify technology companies of the presence of unauthorized content, even when it is the same parties posting the same material.” However, unlike the RIAA and the other music industry associations, Fried did not call on Congress to amend Section 512. Instead, it urged the Internet companies to “engage voluntarily and collaboratively with the creative community on solutions that work for everyone….” Fried asked for “better help from technology companies to steer traffic away from websites dedicated to theft….” Fried provided “automatically removing duplicative copies of the same unauthorized content” as an example of how effective notice and staydown could be achieved.

What’s Missing From This Discussion?

The Internet Association’s Michael Beckerman stated that “the bargain” at the heart of the DMCA “is a simple: rightsholders have a mechanism to address infringement without engaging in a lengthy and expensive battle, and internet platforms that respond quickly to remove infringing content are held harmless for the actions of their users.” MPAA’s Fried referred to this bargain as the DMCA’s “grand design.” And CCIA’s Matt Schruers described it as “a compromise between copyright holders and online services.”

Judge Leval, in his recent decision in Capitol Records v. Vimeo, agreed with this characterization of Section 512 as a compromise:

what Congress intended in passing § 512(c) was to strike a compromise under which, in return for the obligation to take down infringing works promptly on receipt of notice of infringement from the owner, Internet service providers would be relieved of liability for user-posted infringements of which they were unaware, as well as of the obligation to scour matter posted on their services to ensure against copyright infringement. The purpose of the compromise was to make economically feasible the provision of valuable Internet services while expanding protections of the interests of copyright owners through the new notice-and-takedown provision.

But the compromise embodied by Section 512 is part of a larger compromise embodied by titles I and II of the DMCA. Title II created Section 512. Title I implemented the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty by creating prohibitions on the circumvention of technological protection measures and the removal of copyright management information. These provisions now constitute Chapter 12 of title 17, including the controversial Section 1201.

Title I and title II originally were introduced as separate bills (the WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act and the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, respectively). The WIPO implementation bill was supported by the content industry and opposed by sectors of the technology industry. The safe harbor bill was supported by the online service providers and opposed by the content industry. In the face of this opposition, both bills stalled. Senator Orrin Hatch, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in a bold legislative move, merged the two bills into one. He calculated that the content industry would be willing to accept the safe harbors in exchange for WIPO implementation. This calculation proved correct.

The content providers believe that Section 1201 has benefitted them enormously. In response to a notice of inquiry recently issued by the Copyright Office concerning Section 1201, the Association of American Publishers, the Motion Picture Association of America, and the Recording Industry Association of America filed joint comments stating that “the protections of Chapter 12 have enabled an enormous variety of flexible, legitimate digital business models to emerge and thrive….” BSA|The Software Alliance, the Copyright Alliance, the Software and Information Industry Association, the Entertainment Software Association, and Microsoft similarly asserted that Section 1201 has facilitated the secure online distribution of content.

In other words, the content providers applaud title I of the DMCA (Section 1201) as much as they complain about title II of the DMCA (Section 512). This is not surprising. Although Congress attempted to achieve a degree of balance within each title—although each title contains internal compromises–at the end of the day, the grand bargain of the DMCA was the marriage of the WIPO implementation and the safe harbor bills. According to the content providers, title I has “enabled an enormous variety of flexible, legitimate digital business modes to emerge and thrive.” And according to the Internet industry, title II has “allowed the Internet to become what it is today—a worldwide democratizing platform for communication, creativity, and commerce.”

Given the tradeoffs that Congress made in assembling the DMCA, policymakers should not assess the impact of any title in isolation. In particular, any adverse impact content providers claim they suffer on account of the safe harbors in Section 512 must be weighed against the benefit they receive from Section 1201 (which has had an adverse impact on other stakeholders).

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Marrakesh Treaty for the Blind, Visually Impaired and Print Disabled to Enter Into Force

Today, June 30, 2016, the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled Reached its 20th ratification and will enter into force on September 30, 2016.

Yesterday, WIPO received the ratification documents from Ecuador and Guatemala and today Canada deposited its instrument of accession to the Marrakesh Treaty.  With these three ratifications, the treaty now has twenty ratifications and countries from nearly every region have ratified including: ArgentinaAustraliaBrazil, ChileEl Salvador, India, Israel, Mali, MexicoMongolia, North Korea, Paraguay,PeruSingapore, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.  The twentieth ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty occurred just over three years from when WIPO concluded the diplomatic conference and adopted the treaty.

The Marrakesh Treaty sets forth minimum standards for limitations and exceptions to facilitate access to accessible format works.  It would also permit cross-border sharing of these accessible formats, allowing countries to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts and resources in the creation of these accessible works.  Additionally, the Treaty would facilitate importation of works created in other languages.

WIPO’s press release on this historic moment is available here.

 

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Supreme Court of the United States Upholds University of Texas’ Affirmative Action Policy

On Thursday, June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States in a 4-3 vote upheld the affirmative action admissions policy in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II), finding that the race-conscious admissions program in use at the time of Fisher’s application is lawful under the Equal Protection Clause.  Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor.  Justices Thomas, Alito and Roberts dissented with Justice Kagan recusing herself.

This case was previously heard by the Supreme Court which resulted in a 2013 opinion which in a 7-1 vote, remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit.  In Fisher I, the Supreme Court directed the Fifth Circuit to reconsider the case under the higher threshold of strict scrutiny in determining whether UT’s admission policy comports with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  On remand, the Fifth Circuit once again upheld UT’s admission policy in which UT accepts the top 10% of graduates from Texas high schools and uses a holistic review for the remaining open spots.  The holistic approach includes many factors, with race being one of the factors.  The admissions process did not have quotas or specific goals in terms of the number of students meeting specific characteristics.  The Association of Research Libraries joined with 37 other higher education organizations in an amicus brief supporting the University of Texas.  Oral arguments were held in December.

In the opinion, Justice Kennedy first lays out three “controlling principles” from Fisher I in determining the constitutionality of a public university’s affirmative-action program: 1) the program must be evaluated under the higher bar of strict scrutiny; 2) universities cannot impose a fixed quota, but deference is given to a university’s “reasoned, principled explanation” to pursue diversity; and 3) the university bears the burden of proving that a “nonracial approach” would not promote its interests in promoting diversity (i.e., the university is not given deference on this point).

Although Justices Kennedy and Breyer seemed interested in the possibility of remanding the case back to the trial court during oral arguments, the opinion points out that there would be limited data available and “a remand would do nothing more than prolong a suit that has already persisted for eight years and cost the parties on both sides significant resources.”  While remand was not appropriate in this case, the majority opinion cautions the University of Texas to “remain mindful that diversity takes many forms” and that “Through regular evaluation of data and consideration of student experience, the University must tailor its approach in light of changing circumstances, ensuring that race plays no greater role than is necessary to meet its compelling interest.”

The court turns to the university’s goals in trying to improve diversity, noting that the “goals cannot be elusory or amorphous–they must be sufficiently measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach them.”  Here, the University of Texas

identifies the educational values it seeks to realize through its admissions process: the destruction of stereotypes, the “‘promot[ion of] cross-racial understanding,’” the preparation of a student body “‘for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,’” and the “‘cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.’”  Later in the proposal, the University explains that it strives to provide an “academic environment” that offers a “robust exchange of ideas, exposure to differing cultures, preparation for the challenges of an increasingly diverse workforce, and acquisition of competencies required of future leaders.”  All of these objectives, as a general matter, mirror the “compelling interest” this Court has approved in its prior cases.

The University has provided in addition a “reasoned, principled explanation” for its decision to pursue these goals . . . following a year-long study, which concluded that “[t]he use of race-neutral policies and programs ha[d] not been successful” in “provid[ing] an educational setting that fosters cross-racial understanding, provid[ing] enlightened discussion and learning, [or] prepar[ing] students to function in an increasingly diverse workforce and society.”  (internal citations omitted)

The Court also rejects Fisher’s argument that the top 10% plan was sufficient to promote diversity.  Indeed, the Court notes that “the record itself contains significant evidence, both statistical and anecdotal” that race-neutral admissions policies were insufficient.  Key pieces of evidence including the demographic data the University submitted showing the stagnation of minority student enrollment from 1996-2002; anecdotal evidence of minority students feeling lonely and isolated; and quantitative evidence of the lack of enrollment of at least one minority student in classes with five or more students.

The majority also rejects Fisher’s proposal to eliminate the holistic approach and increase the percentage of students admitted based on class rank alone.  The Court points out the deficiencies of using a single metric to admit students:

Even if, as a matter of raw numbers, minority enrollment would increase under such a regime, petitioner would be hard-pressed to find convincing support for the proposition that college admissions would be improved if they were a function of class rank alone. That approach would sacrifice all other aspects of diversity in pursuit of enrolling a higher number of minority students. A system that selected every student through class rank alone would exclude the star athlete or musician whose grades suffered because of daily practices and training. It would exclude a talented young biologist who struggled to maintain above-average grades in humanities classes. And it would exclude a student whose freshman-year grades were poor because of a family crisis but who got herself back on track in her last three years of school, only to find herself just outside of the top decile of her class.

These are but examples of the general problem. Class rank is a single metric, and like any single metric, it will capture certain types of people and miss others. This does not imply that students admitted through holistic review are necessarily more capable or more desirable than those admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan. It merely reflects the fact that privileging one characteristic above all others does not lead to a diverse student body. Indeed, to compel universities to admit students based on class rank alone is in deep tension with the goal of educational diversity as this Court’s cases have defined it . . . At its center, the Top Ten Percent Plan is a blunt instrument that may well compromise the University’s own definition of the diversity it seeks.

None of Fisher’s proposed solutions or other solutions discussed during litigation were shown to be “available” and “workable” means of achieving UT’s educational goals and therefore, the Court finds, the university has met its burden of demonstrating its admissions plan was narrowly tailored.

The majority opinion concludes that while it is upholding UT’s policy, the university must continue to revisit its admissions policy and reflect on it:

A university is in large part defined by those intangible “qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness.” Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634 (1950). Considerable deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational mission. But still, it remains an enduring challenge to our Nation’s education system to reconcile the pursuit of diversity with the constitutional promise of equal treatment and dignity.

In striking this sensitive balance, public universities, like the States themselves, can serve as “laboratories for experimentation.”  The University of Texas at Austin has a special opportunity to learn and to teach. The University now has at its disposal valuable data about the manner in which different approaches to admissions may foster diversity or instead dilute it. The University must continue to use this data to scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess whether changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both positive and negative, of the affirmative-action measures it deems necessary.

Ultimately, today’s decision is a win for universities (particularly given that at least one of the dissenting justices indicated that he would have overturned the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter, which allows race to be considered as one factor but that does not amount to a quota).  However, the majority opinion takes care to caution that admissions policies using race as a factor must continue to be revisited in light of new evidence and changes in circumstance.

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DC Circuit Court Upholds FCC’s Open Internet Order Governing Net Neutrality

On Tuesday, June 14, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit released its long-awaited opinion in U.S. Telecom Association v. FCC, upholding the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order by a 2-1 vote.  On petition for review, the petitioners challenged the FCC’s reclassification of broadband service as a Title II common carriers, reclassification of mobile broadband service, the ban on paid prioritization and the General Conduct Rule, and also argued that the net neutrality rules violate the First Amendment.  The DC Circuit found against each of these challenges and denied the petitions for review.

The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order set forth rules governing net neutrality, ensuring that Internet providers cannot create “fast lanes” and “slow lanes” by reclassifying broadband under Title II of the Communications Act while also relying on the FCC’s authority under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act. In its accompanying report, the FCC noted the importance of net neutrality, including for specific communities:

Open Internet rules benefit investors, innovators, and end users by providing more certainty to each regarding broadband providers’ behavior, and helping to ensure the market is conducive to optimal use of the Internet. Open Internet rules are also critical for ensuring that people living and working in rural areas can take advantage of the substantial benefits that the open Internet has to offer. In minority communities where many individuals’ only Internet connection may be through a mobile device, robust open Internet rules help make sure these communities are not negatively impacted by harmful broadband provider conduct. Such rules additionally provide essential safeguards to ensure that the Internet flourishes as a platform for education and research.

The DC Circuit opinion begins with history of the FCC’s Order, including the DC Circuit’s 2014 Verizon opinion in which it vacated the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules as impermissible because they subjected broadband providers to common carrier treatment.  Prior to the FCC’s Open Internet Order reclassifying broadband providers, the Internet was classified as an information service, exempt from common carriage rules.  However, the court notes that in Verizon, “we upheld the Commission’s conclusion that section 706 provides it authority to promulgate open internet rules” and “the Commission’s ‘finding that Internet openness fosters . . . edge provider innovation . . . was . . . reasonable and grounded in substantial evidence’ and that the Commission had ‘more than adequately supported and explained its conclusion that edge-provider innovation leads to the expansion and improvement of broadband infrastructure.”  In its 2014 opinion, the DC cCircuit recognized that absent rules governing net neutrality “broadband providers represent a threat to Internet openness and could act in ways that would ultimately inhibit the speed and extent of future broadband deployment.”

The DC Circuit also lays out its role in reviewing the FCC’s decision, noting that it “is a limited one . . . to ensure that an agency has acted ‘within the limits of [Congress’s] delegation’ of authority and that its action is not ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”  The court’s role is not to make policy judgments.

Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court first upholds the FCC’s reclassification under Title II pointing out the evidence that “consumers use broadband principally to access third-party content, not email and other add-on applications.”  The Internet is marketed to consumers as a conduit for transmission of data as a standalone service rather than for particular add-on services.  The DC Circuit then quickly rejects the petitioners’ procedural arguments that the FCC did not provide adequate notice that it was considering reclassification (among other issues), pointing directly to the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) calling for comment on this issue.

With respect to the substantive arguments regarding Title II reclassification, the DC Circuit points out that consumer perception of the service is key:

when interpreting this provision in Brand X, the Supreme Court held that classification of broadband turns on consumer perception . . . Nothing in Brand X suggests that an examination of market power or competition in the market is a prerequisite to classifying broadband . . . citing the Commission’s economic findings as additional support for its approach is a far cry from requiring the Commission to find  market power.

Additionally, the DC Circuit notes that the FCC’s judgment that any impact its Open Internet Order will have on broadband investment are outweighed by the positive effects of the “virtuous circle,” is given “particularly deferential review, as long as they are reasonable” because it is a predictive judgment under the FCC’s field of discretion and expertise.

Similarly, the DC Circuit upholds the FCC’s decision to reclassify mobile broadband, pointing out the FCC’s finding of the ubiquity and widespread use of mobile broadband.  In addition,

 

Avoiding that statutory contradiction not only assures consistent regulatory treatment of mobile broadband across Titles II and III, but it also assures consistent regulatory treatment of mobile broadband and fixed broadband, in furtherance of the Commission’s objective that “[b]roadband users should be able to expect that they will be entitled to the same Internet openness protections no matter what technology they use to access the Internet.” 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5638 ¶ 92. When consumers use a mobile device (such as a tablet or smartphone) to access the internet, they may establish a connection either through mobile broadband or through a Wi-Fi connection at home, in the office, or at an airport or coffee shop. Such Wi-Fi connections originate from a landline broadband connection, which is now a telecommunications service regulated as a common carrier under Title II. If a consumer loses her Wi-Fi connection for some reason while accessing the internet—including, for instance, if she walks out the front door of her house, and thus out of Wi-Fi range—her device could switch automatically from a Wi-Fi connection to a mobile broadband connection. If mobile broadband were classified as a private mobile service, her ongoing session would no longer be subject to common carrier treatment. In that sense, her mobile device could be subject to entirely different regulatory rules depending on how it happens to be connected to the internet at any particular moment—which could change from one minute to the next, potentially even without her awareness.

After upholding the FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband Internet service, the DC Circuit turned to challenges against the ban on paid-prioritization and the FCC’s General Conduct Rule.

With respect to the ban on paid-prioritization, the Court points out (and the challenger conceded) that the FCC “grounded the rules in ‘multiple complementary sources of legal authority’–not only Titles II and III, but also section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”  The DC Circuit again points to its 2014 Verizon decision in which it upheld the FCC’s broad authority to implement rules under Section 706.  The Court states “as we held in Verizon and reaffirm today, the Commission’s section 706 authority extends to rules ‘governing broadband providers’ treatment of internet traffic’–including the anti-paid-prioritization rule–in reliance on the virtuous cycle theory.”  The Court also finds that the ban on paid-prioritization “is geared to promoting the effective deployment of new telecommunications technologies such as broadband [and] . . . is entirely consistent with the Act’s objectives.”

Turning to the General Conduct Rule, the DC Circuit notes that

The Commission adopted the General Conduct Rule based on a determination that the three bright-line rules— barring blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization—were, on their own, insufficient “to protect the open nature of the Internet.” Id. at 5659–60 ¶¶ 135–36. Because “there may exist other current or future practices that cause the type of harms [the] rules are intended to address,” the Commission thought it “necessary” to establish a more general, no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard. Id. The standard is designed to be flexible so as to address unforeseen practices and prevent circumvention of the bright-line rules. The Commission will evaluate conduct under the General Conduct Rule on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a “non-exhaustive” list of seven factors.

The court finds that the rule is not impermissibly vague because it did not seek to retroactively enforce a new policy and the FCC provides a mechanism for advisory opinions.  The due process concerns are satisfied provided that the regulations “are sufficiently specific that a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the conditions the regulations are meant to address and the objectives the regulations are meant to achieve, would have fair warning.”  The FCC not only set forth seven factors to guide determination of what constitutes unreasonable interference with, or disadvantaging of, end-user or edge provider access, but also a description of how each factor would be interpreted and applied.

The Court also points out that overly specific rules could be harmful:

Given that “we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language,” those sorts of descriptions suffice to provide fair warning as to the type of conduct prohibited by the General Conduct Rule. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). To be sure, as a multifactor standard applied on a case-by-case basis, a certain degree of uncertainty inheres in the structure of the General Conduct Rule. But a regulation is not impermissibly vague because it is “marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Fair notice in these circumstances demands “no more than a reasonable degree of certainty.” Throckmorton v. National Transportation Safety Board, 963 F.2d 441, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are mindful, moreover, that “by requiring regulations to be too specific courts would be opening up large loopholes allowing conduct which should be regulated to escape regulation.” Freeman, 108 F.3d at 362 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). That concern is particularly acute here, because of the speed with which broadband technology continues to evolve. The dynamic market conditions and rapid pace of technological development give rise to pronounced concerns about ready circumvention of particularized regulatory restrictions. The flexible approach adopted by the General Conduct Rule aims to address that concern in a field in which “specific regulations cannot begin to cover all of the infinite variety of conditions.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, the Court rejects the arguments that the Open Internet Order violates a broadband provider’s First Amendment rights because “Common carriers have long been subject to nondiscrimination and equal access obligations akin to those imposed by the rules without raising any First Amendment question.  The obligations affect a common carrier’s neutral transmission of others’ speech, not a carrier’s communication of its own message.”  Furthermore:

The absence of any First Amendment concern in the context of common carriers rests on the understanding that such entities, insofar as they are subject to equal access mandates, merely facilitate the transmission of the speech of others rather than engage in speech in their own right.

. . .

Of course, insofar as a broadband provider might offer its own content—such as a news or weather site—separate from its internet access service, the provider would receive the same protection under the First Amendment as other producers of internet content. But the challenged rules apply only to the provision of internet access as common carriage, as to which equal access and nondiscrimination mandates present no First Amendment problem.

ARL, together with three other library associations, filed an amicus brief in September 2015 supporting the FCC’s net neutrality rules, pointing out the importance for libraries and higher education:

As broadband subscribers, providers of Internet access points to patrons, and providers of digital content and services, libraries rely on the open character of the Internet to achieve their missions of providing equitable access to information, enhancing education and promoting life-long learning, supporting democracy and informed citizenry, and protecting intellectual freedom.

Today’s decision is an important win for libraries and higher education, particularly with respect to the upholding of the ban on paid prioritization and the General Conduct rule. Without bright-line rules banning paid prioritization, libraries and other institutions serving the public interest may not be able to pay extra fees for enhanced transmission of their content. Prioritization risks that network operators would give priority to entertainment or other commercial content over education, civic engagement, access to information or other services. Additionally, the General Conduct Rule is a necessary tool to ensure that the Internet remains open and neutral.  The General Conduct Rule protects against future harms, including those made possible by technological innovations and advances.

 

 

 

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